Marilyn Mandarino Owen v. Robert Ballard Owen : Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Marilyn Mandarino Owen v. Robert Ballard Owen
: Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Felton; Attornes forDefendant-RespondentJoseph L. Henriod; Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Owen v. Owen, No. 15330 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/764
IN THE SUP:3.V,:S COURT OF THE STATE OE' UTAH 
MARILYN MANDARINO OWEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15330 
ROBERT BALLARD OWEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., Judge 
Rooer-:: Felton 
Joseph L. Henriod 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NIELSEN, HENRICO, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plain-::iff-Appellant 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
.:>.ttorney for Jefer:dant-Respondent 
Twelve Exchange Place 
Sa~t LakQ Citv. Utah 84111 
:MiR 10 1978 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE . . 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
RELIEF ON APPEAL . 









RESPONDENT HAS MISREPRESENTED APPELLANT'S FINANCIAL 
SITUATION AND HER PRESENT ATTEMPT TO MODIFY RESPONDENT'S 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Point II. 
APPELLANT HAS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR 
THE COURT TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE ....... 12 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . 13 
AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
DeRose v. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1967) ..... 13 
Erickson v. Erickson, 8 Utah 2d 381, 335 P.2d 618,619(1959)10 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 566 P.2d 542 (Ore. 1977) ...... 11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN MANDARINO OWEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT BALLARD OWEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 15330 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Supreme Court on appeal from 
a decision of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, denying Plaintiff-Appellant's petition 
for modification of a divorce decree as to child support pay-
ments. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court ruled that there had been no substantial 
change of circumstances since the decree and denied Plaintiff-
Appellant' s petition for modification of child support. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the judgment 
of the lower court and to grant Plaintiff-Appellant's request 
for modification of the divorce decree. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant files this reply brief to answer 
Respondent's unfair characterization of her financial situation 
and his misrepresentation of the facts as discussed in his 
brief. 
The statement of facts in the two previously-filed briefs 
appear to be undisputed as far as what events have occurred up 
to the present time in this case. However, there appears to be 
sharp disagreement as to what inferences and assumptions can be 
drawn from the undisputed facts. 
Respondent, in his brief, characterizes the Appellant 
as an irresponsible money-manager, who has dug her own grave and 
must now bury herself in it. He further alleges that she is 
totally unconcerned about her children's welfare and is simply 
attempting to increase her own standard of living by trying to 
get "disguised alimony" (Respondent's Brief p.14). He further 
misrepresents that she quit a job in order to create an impoverished 
appearance to harass the Respondent through her allegedly unfounded 
court actions (Respondent's Brief p.14). Appellant submits that 
she would indeed be an irresponsible money-manager if she sat 
back and watched her children forego the necessities of life 
without attempting to make her former husband share in the cost 
of such necessities. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RESPONDENT HAS MISREPRESENTED APPELLANT'S 
FINANCIAL SITUATION AND HER PRESENT ATTEMPT TO MODIFY 
RESPONDENT'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
A. Appellant's unemployment at the time of the hearing. 
Respondent's brief first attacks Appellant's present income 
situation and accuses her of "taking steps to set up artificial 
grounds" for a modification of the divorce decree (Respondent's 
Brief p.11). For example, Respondent accuses the Appellant of 
quitting her job in order to present a picture of poverty to 
the court (Respondent's Brief p.6). However, Appellant testified 
that she quit her job under fire; that she had a choice of quitting 
or being fired. (Tr. p.4) She did not quit because she discovered 
she "disliked working" or because she found working "distasteful" 
as Respondent suggests. (Respondent's Brief p.7) 
At the hearing, Appellant elaborated on the reasons for 
leaving her job. One of the several reasons was that her bosses 
were dissatisfied with her typing skills since she suffered the 
burns on her hand. (Tr. 5) A quick reading of the transcript 
quickly dispels any notion that Appellant quit her job to "set up" 
a destitute financial picture for this modification hearing. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff stipulated in court that she had the 
capacity to earn $600.00 every month, although she was unemployed 
at the time of the hearing. Thus, it is unfair to harp upon her 
unemployment as a ploy to gain sympathy with the court. 
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B. Appellant does not have "unclean hands." 
Respondent claims that Appellant has "unclean hands" and 
accuses her of lying about her income sources. (Respondent's 
Brief p.10) In particular, Respondent points out that Appellant 
never listed on her "income affidavit" that she was receiving 
an average of about $250.00 a month from her father. 
Brief p.10) 
(Respondent's 
Appellant testified, however, that she could not list her 
father's contributions as income because she did not receive a 
set amount each month. Instead, every so often her father ca~e 
to her rescue and gratuitously bailed her out. (Tr. pp. 19-20) 
To accuse Appellant of lying for not listing unsolicited, irregular 
and unexpected gifts from her father which she af~er-the-fact 
estimated to average $250.00 a month seems to be unfair. 
The true facts are that she is no longer receiving any 
assistance from her father who is presently in a rest home. 
(Tr. p. 7) 
It is also interesting to note that Respondent accuses 
Appellant of lying for not listing irregular gifts as income, 
but at the same time he testified that he doesn't list his 
$5,000.00 equity in the home among his assets because he doesn't 
know when he will receive it. (Tr. p. 31) He also failed to list 
that asset on his response to Appellant's Interrogatories. 
(Tr. p.31) Respondent continued to assert on the stand that the 
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$5,000.00 was not an asset even though Appellant's counsel asked 
him if he would sell it (the interest) for $4,000.00. He responded 
that he would not. It appears to be a misrepresentation of the 
facts to accuse Appellant of lying for not listing irregular 
gifts as income when Respondent refuses to list equity in a 
house as an asset. 
c. Appellant's "229% increase in income." 
Respondent next asserts that Appellant has "manipulated 
her income to present a destitute picture" and asserts that she 
has enjoyed a 229% increase in income since the time of the 
divorce. (Respondent's Brief p.14) Such an assertion not only 
mischaracterizes her attempt to modify Respondent's child support 
obligation but is completely ridiculous arithmetically and 
logically. For example, to come up with that percentage, counsel 
for the Respondent conveniently chose the highest monthly salary 
that Appellant has ever earned. Next, he multiplies that by 12 
to get a fictional yearly income and then adds the child support 
Respondent pays to come up with an entirely speculative yearly 
income. (Respondent's Brief pp.3,6) Of course, the fact that 
such an amount was never received by Appellant does not prevent 
Respondent's counsel from using that figure to calculate what 
her percentage increase in salary has been. To obtain a base 
figure for calculating Appellant's increase in income, Respondent's 
counsel adds only her child support and alimony received in 1973. 
-5-
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(Respondent's Brief, p. 3) He conveniently forgets to include 
the $672.00 she received in 1973 from a real estate contract. 
(Tr. p.6) He also fails to include the $225.00 average monthly 
help her father gave her. It is interesting to note, however, 
that when Appellant did not include that latter sum in her 
affidavit, Respondent's counsel accused her of "lying." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10) Nevertheless, he also conveniently 
fails to include it in her income when to do so makes his argu-
ments look better. Thus, he has successfully manipulated her 
highs and lows to the point that she is allegedly now making nore 
than enough for her needs. 
Such a computation is faulty. If counsel wishes to compare 
percentages, he would need to start with all sources of income 
for the Appellant in 1973. In that year (the time of the divorce) 
she received $672.00 off a real estate contract. (Tr. p.6) She 
also received $2,400.00 that year in child support and $1,800.00 
in alimony. She also received approximately $250.00 each month 
from her father. ($3,000.00 that year) (Tr. p.7) Thus, 
Appellant's income for that first year was $7,772.00. 
As to her present income, Appellant received $600.00 net 
for the first five months of 1977 and stipulated that she would 
be capable of earning $600.00 gross every month thereafter or 
about $500.00 net. Her total net "earnings" would then equal 
$6,500.00. Her child support is $2,400.00. She no longer 
receives income from the real estate contract, alimony or her 
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father. Thus, her net income this year was $8,900.00. Therefore, 
her increase in net spendable income has been about 14% in four 
years -- a far cry from the 229% Respondent's counsel suggests. 
Respondent's attempt to discredit Appellant's financial situation 
is a blatant attempt to mislead the court and only accentuates 
the weakness of his argument against the increase in child support. 
In addition, even if Appellant did enjoy any income increase 
since the time of the divorce, such an increase was contemplated 
by the terms of the decree itself. Appellant was the mother of 
a preschool child at the time of the divorce and obviously unable 
to work fulltime. She was given alimony for 18 months. That 
alimony has long since terminated and now that both children 
are in school, Appellant can work more. Thus, it is unfair to 
attempt to penalize her for earning more money when in reality 
she is only accomplishing what the decree of divorce contemplated. 
The fact that she has worked since her alimony was terminated 
is no basis for denying an increase in child support on the 
grounds that her income has increased over the years. Such an 
accusation is unfair. It is obvious that any benefits the 
children receive from their father also indirectly benefit ~heir 
mother and frees up money for other purposes, but to characterize 
that as a "disguised" attempt for alimony seems to be an attempt 
to cloud the issue of a child support modification. 
D. Respondent's alleged "26% increase" in income. 
Respondent's counsel attempts to disguise Respondent's 
-7-
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increase in income by alleging that Appellant has enjoyed a 
229% increase in income since the time of the divorce. Such 
reasoning has been discussed above. 
Respondent's increase in income during the same period of 
$13,944.00 to $19,008.00 should really speak for itself. He 
supports only himself on that amount (less his child support 
obligations) while Appellant supports herself and two children 
on $8,900.00 in net spendable income (including child support 
payments). Such a sum represents a figure less than half as 
large as Respondent's income. 
In addition, Respondent's counsel argues that Respondent's 
increase from $13,944.00 to $19,008.00 has been eaten up in 
increased costs of living. (Respondent's Brief, p.15) If that 
is true, it is only because he is now living alone in a three-
bedroom condominium. (Tr. p.32) 
Also, Respondent's counsel appears to have made another 
arithmetic error. He asserts that Respondent has enjoyed a 26% 
increase in income in the four years since the divorce. (Respon-
dent's Brief pp. 3, 6, 15) Although Respondent's gross income 
figures speak for themselves, a quick mathematical calculation 
shows the increase to be 36%, not the listed 26%. 
Finally, it should be noted in any comparison of Respondent's 
income for the years 1973 and 1977 that the Respondent no longer 
pays Appellant any alimony and his net spendable income has 
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increased $1,800.00 a year by that fact alone. Thus, his net 
spendable income has actually increased more than the bare gross 
figures listed above. 
E. Appellant's equity in her house does not release 
Respondent from his obligation to support his children. Next, 
Respondent argues that the Appellant does not need additional 
child support because he asserts that she is sitting on a virtual 
gold mine. He asserts that she has at least $25,000.00 equity 
in her home. However, Respondent does not suggest how Appellant 
is to tap that great source of wealth. 
Apparently she has two alternatives. First, she can 
mortgage the home. However, such action would only increase 
her monthly bills which she already cannot meet. Second, she 
can sell the home and move into an apartment. While such a 
solution is possible, Respondent can hardly be serious to suggest 
that his children be forced to move out of their home just to 
make ends meet when he has the resources to prevent that action. 
It would seem more profitable to reserve such a drastic action 
for later years, if needed, to give the children a college 
education or to meet unexpected emergencies as they occur. In 
addition, the price of an apartment may well prove to be more than 
her present house payment. Thus, Plaintiff should not be required 
to sell her home in order to obtain an otherwise unreachable equity 
which she has therein where Respondent has the means to prevent 
such action. 
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Several other considerations should be made with respect 
to Appellant's equity in her home. 
First, the Plaintiff's equity in her home should not be 
used to disguise Defendant's responsibility to support his 
children. "Her" property should be distinguished from that of 
the children. The children need to look to both parents to 
support them. See Erickson v. Erickson, 8 Utah 2d 381, 335 
P.2d 618, 619 (1959). Her equity in the house does not relieve 
Respondent from his obligation of adequately supporting his 
children. 
Second, the Plaintiff did not receive a disproportionate 
amount of equity in the home at the time of the divorce. The 
vast majority of the present equity is the result of the rise 
in prices of homes in the Salt Lake Valley which has occurred 
recently, as well as her making four years of payments on the 
home with her father's help. 
Third, aside from the fact that Respondent would benefit 
to the tune of $5,000.00 cash if Appellant had to sell her home, 
he fails to mention that the only reason the couple was able to 
buy the house at all during the marriage was the fact that the 
Appellant's father contributed $7,000.00 towards the purchase 
of their first house. (Tr. p.25) 
Respondent needs to distinguish between money that is the 
Appellant's and the obligation which Respondent has to support 
his children. 
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Finally, testimony at the hearing suggests that the 
Respondent also has a substantial equity in his three bedroom 
condominium. (Tr. p. 34-36) 
A recent case from the State of Oregon, MacDonald v. 
MacDonald, 566 P.2d 542 (Ore. 1977), is instructive and very 
much on point. Therein, both the husband and the wife had 
debts of approximately $5,000.00. The court increased the 
former husband's child support obligation from $110.00 per 
month to $200.00 per month despite the fact the former wife had 
a "fairly substantial equity" in the home where she and the child-
ren lived and despite the fact that the former husband had no 
assets of any consequence. Similar to the present case, the 
Defendant's husband had an income of $21,145.00. (Defendant-
Respondent herein makes $19,008.00 at his present salary. See 
Tr. p. 26) 
F. Appellant's purchase of clothing. Respondent alleges 
that Appellant's purchase of $375.00 worth of clothing for herself 
in January of 1977 illustrates her financial irresponsibility 
and that she has no meritorious argument for increased needs. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.4, 11, Tr. p.18) Appellant explained at 
the hearing how she had no clothing suitable for the employment 
She was able to obtain and was required to add to her clothing. 
The sum of $375.00 for an entire working wardrobe does not appear 
to be high where she had to start from scratch. 
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POINT II. APPELLANT HAS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
FOR THE COURT TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
A divorce modification hearing is an action in which the 
trial court has a large amount of discretion. However, Appellant 
submits that the lower court erred in its order denying Appellant's 
requested modification. Respondent's counsel did not submit any 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the lower court for 
signature and the record does not contain any such pleadings. 
Therefore, this court must rely upon the transcript of the pro-
ceedings in determining whether the lower court abused its 
discretion and erred in its judgment. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Respondent's counsel 
argued that general inflation and increased ages of minor children 
could not be a basis for modification of a divorce decree. 
(Tr. p.42) Appellant has previously pointed out that such an 
argument is wrong. (Appellant's Brief pp. 6, 7) However, without 
any findings of fact or conclusions of law, Appellant has no way 
of knowing if the court erroneously believed the arguments of 
Respondent's counsel. If he so believed, this court must correct 
that erroneous belief and make its ruling on the facts under that 
doctrine. 
Appellant showed at the lower court hearing that her 
children were going without some necessities of life (see 
Appellant's Brief pp. 3-5) while Respondent was living alone in 
his three bedroom condominium on his $19,008.00 yearly income. 
(Tr. p.32) 
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Appellant submits that a reading of the transcript clearly 
shows that the lower court erred in denying her request to modify 
the divorce decree. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Respondent's counsel's misrepresentation of the 
facts, his mathematical miscalculations and his allegations of 
bad faith on the part of the Appellant, the record and transcript 
clearly show that the lower court erroneously denied her modifi-
cation petition. 
It is true that benefits received by her children also 
indirectly benefit the Appellant. However, the present action 
is not a ploy to obtain "disguised alimony". Appellant's concern 
is that her children can eat properly (Tr. p. 16), have drapes 
on windows in their home (Tr. p. 14) and be able to participate 
in normal activities of life such as music lessons, etc. (Tr. p. 21) 
As this Court stated in DeRose v. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77, 426 
P.2d 221 (1967): 
"Due to the seriousness of such proceedings [divorce] 
and the vital effect they have upon people's lives ..• 
changes should be made if that seems essential to the 
accomplishment of the desired objectives of the decree: 
that is, to make such an arrangement of the property and 
economic resources of the parties that they will have the 
best possible opportunity to reconstruct their lives on a 
happy and useful basis for themselves and their children." 
426 P.2d at 222. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the instant case presents 
a situation where "changes should be made" to accomplish the "desired 
objectives of the decree" in order to provide adequately for the 
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minor children of the parties. 
7 +"' DATED this day of March, 1978. 
Joseph L. Henriod 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant by delivering 
two copies thereof, personally, to Robert Felton, Attorney for 
Respondent, Twelve Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
thl.. s 10+- day of March, 1978. 
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